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**AIRFIELD DEFENSE FOR
GLOBAL REACH/GLOBAL POWER**

BY

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19. training the entire specialty so that it is packaged to support any contingency in minimum time, and incorporating jointness throughout the career field from doctrine to training. Finally these proposals provide the United States Air Force an organic force which operates equally well in peace or war. Now more than ever, with shrinking defense dollars for replacement, it is critical that we protect each remaining airpower asset for Global Reach/Global Power.

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AIRFIELD DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL REACH/GLOBAL POWER

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The New World Order, or Post Cold War Period, are best described as a time of increased emphasis on domestic issues in the United States, the rise of nationalistic trends globally, and a greater emphasis by the world community on the United Nations as an honest broker in international disputes. Our emphasis on domestic issues centered on the national deficit and resulted in a scramble by Federal departments for the scarce dollars left after severe budget reductions. This manifested itself in a much reduced United States Department of Defense dependent on crisis response instead of forward deployed forces. The Air Force developed its new doctrine around this concept of Global Reach/Global Power. Global Reach/Global Power is accomplished by a smaller, highly capable force with the ability to respond rapidly with decisive power anywhere in the world. To be successful, every specialty in the Air Force must be able to transition from peacetime to war in minimum time and deploy without any loss of capability. This paper promotes several steps which will make the Security Police more capable of performing its mission in both peace and war. It includes broadening the Security Police mission to accurately reflect all its functions in support of Global Reach/Global Power, equipping and training the entire specialty so that it is packaged to support any contingency in minimum time, and incorporating jointness throughout the career field from doctrine to training. Finally these proposals provide the United States Air Force an organic force which operates equally well in peace or war. Now more than ever, with shrinking defense dollars for replacement, it is critical that we protect each remaining airpower asset for Global Reach/Global Power.

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INTRODUCTION

The Air Force Security Police is the ground defense force of the Air Force. Security Police authorizations for manpower are based on peacetime missions of security and law enforcement. Security Police mobility tasking is a secondary mission and less than one third of the security police personnel are organized, trained, and equipped for this mission. The Cold War is over. Personnel reductions across the Air Force have resulted in a drawdown of security police from approximately 40,000 to a projected total of 28,000. Forward deployed is giving way to forward presence with the bulk of our military forces tasked for crisis response. The Air Force version of this is the concept of global reach, global power. With reduced numbers in CONUS to draw from for mobility to respond to contingencies, changes must be made in the security police approach to its primary and secondary missions. The organization requires modification and the training must be revamped. This paper will briefly explain the history, organization, and mission of the security police and specifically examine its role in airfield defense in the joint rear area on the modern battlefield. Suggestions will then be made as to how the Security Police could be organized, trained, and equipped to meet this mission in our changing world. Recommendations will focus on basic combat skills training for all support personnel, universal airfield defense training for all security police and more specialized training for a packaged airfield defense approach to Air Force power projection across the spectrum of war. This project will address how the Security Police can better meet

their base defense commitments worldwide for the Air Force global mission by combining their two missions into one primary all encompassing mission, that of airfield defense. The term airfield defense in this paper is synonymous with base defense or flight landing strip defense.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

"It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy's aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air." Giulio Douhet, 1921

Throughout the history of U.S. military aviation, U.S. airfields have been largely immune to hostile ground action. The Vietnam War was an exception. During the First World War, allied and enemy air units operated from bases behind a massive complex of trench lines which rarely shifted more than a few hundred meters. They enjoyed nearly absolute security from attack. (1) This posture consequently limited protection of airfields to nothing more than an interior guard system. Following World War I the policy for protection of airfields was based on the experience learned from the "Great War." The neglect of defense of airfields ran true to form for the time because the United States military was in the process of ignoring the expanding importance and role of aviation.

During World War II, the importance of air power as a means of destroying the enemy was demonstrated by the German military. Using a new type of warfare called the "blitzkrieg," the Germans overwhelmed their foes. Allied air bases were seized or destroyed in advance of ground operations by paratroops and airborne forces. During 1940, their speed in taking air bases was a critical factor in the quick victories in France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. (2) By 1941, the

German tactics against allied air bases had become standardized. Bombers attacked troops to fix them in defensive positions, strafing runs by fighters would follow, and then paratroops would jump or land on the airfield. The seizure of Maleme and the subsequent occupation of Crete in 1941 demonstrated the importance of having trained and dedicated personnel for the protection of airfields. A much larger force of British troops were defeated by a smaller German force because the vast majority of British troops were support personnel, untrained in combat skills or defense. This defeat led English Prime Minister Winston Churchill to declare he "would no longer tolerate a half-million Air Force personnel without a combat role. All airmen were to be armed and trained, ready to fight and die in defense of their airfields;...every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundsman, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by a detachment of soldiers." (3) To address the prime minister's concerns, the Royal Air Force Regiment was formed with the primary responsibility of protecting airfields. The United States followed the British lead in 1942 and established Air Base Security Battalions primarily manned by black troops. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Army Air Force (AAF) did away with all of its dedicated ground defense forces. (4)

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 focused urgent operational concern on air base defense. The Air Force immediately began a buildup of ground combat forces for self defense. The Air Police became the nucleus of this force, and expanded from 10,000 personnel in July 1950 to 32,000 in December 1951. (5) Yet after one year of war, the Air Provost Marshal reported to the Air Staff that "the Air Force is without policy or

tactical doctrine for air base ground defense." (6) As the Korean conflict drew to a close, a doctrinal statement was formally implemented by Air Force Regulation (AFR) 355-4, 3 March 1953. It defined local ground defense "as all measures taken by the local Air Force installation commander to deny hostile forces access to the buildings, equipment, facilities, landing fields, dispersal areas, and adjacent terrain" from which the installation could be neutralized. This purely emergency mission excluded "sustained ground defense operations." (7)

Performance of this mission fell to provisional base defense task forces organized and equipped like infantry. These forces consisted of airman not directly linked to flight operations. Air Policemen acted as a cadre for these forces, with the base commander or his provost marshal exercising command. At Headquarters Air Force, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations had primary responsibility for base defense. The technical responsibility for security troops was assigned to the Air Provost Marshal. (8) Although during the Korean War at times over 30,000 North Korean guerrillas were operating in United Nations territory, they ignored air bases as key targets. (9) The effect of this neglect proved costly to the North Koreans as the US Air Forces quickly established air superiority. The North Koreans have corrected this deficiency by dedicating special forces to disrupt airfield operations.

With the end to the Korean War in July 1953, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) assessed and documented its experience in a summary report. Among other things FEAF found that "effective security against sabotage and a workable ground defense system was never fully developed on most Air

Force installations in Korea" because the plans "were not correlated with the threat...or were beyond the unit's capability to execute effectively."

(10) Even in its earliest form the air base defense mission was seen by the United States Air Force as a secondary role/mission with "police" crime fighting duties as their primary mission. Only the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had the vision to understand the need for Air Force base defense. In 1952 it published SAC Manual 205-2 dealing with air base defense. It rejected the notion that the USAF ground defense mission conflicted with Army functions, because self-defense is an inherent responsibility of all commanders. Moreover, Army campaign strategy and tactics for defending land areas inevitably left small areas or points open to attack by small enemy forces. Because the Army was, and must, remain an offensive force, its doctrine contemplated taking the defensive in a given area only to reach a decision elsewhere. Consequently, the Army's limited and temporary defense role might well run counter to, or coincide only accidentally with the USAF mission at specific air base locations. The Army in such instances could scarcely be expected to confine its operations to the defense of Air Force elements not vital to its own mission. (11)

Conversely, SAC officials felt that success of the USAF mission might require point defense of elements which the Army could not afford to protect. Further, as joint defense plans would most likely rely on distant troops, air installations would be vulnerable to surprise attacks pending their arrival (as in Crete), and these defensive forces might not come at all if an overriding Army offensive mission developed at the decisive moment. Hence the SAC rationale held that ground defense must remain an organic USAF function. (12) It is important to realize that these same points and

concerns that the SAC Staff voiced when writing SAC Manual 205-2 over forty years ago are still valid today.

By 1953 the USAF had created a foundation in doctrine, manpower, equipment, and training for building a refined, organic, local ground defense capability. However, this program fell victim to the ambivalent experience of the Korean War, reduced resources, a new national strategy "brinkmanship diplomacy" and revised intelligence estimates. A lesson of the war was the inconsistency between the unrealized actual combat threat to air bases and that envisioned by intelligence sources. (13) The extraordinary growth of Air Police manpower drew critical congressional attention during the post war scrutiny of defense appropriations. When the USAF spokesmen, unversed in security and airfield defense concepts, could not convincingly explain why the Air Force needed so many more "policemen" than the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, only a prompt USAF pledge to reduce Air Police strength by 20 percent restrained Congress from imposing a statutory ceiling. (14) This USAF position to Congress on "policemen" and not "air base defenders" has hampered the acceptance of a dedicated organic USAF base defense force.

Reflecting their dedicated role as policemen, and the nation's concern with the "Communist threat," the Air Police trained to counter clandestine teams of highly trained Soviet agents at all of their nuclear installations during the remaining 1950's, with little attention given to overt ground attacks. In 1957 an Air Staff study found existing base defense doctrine completely unsound. The study scored reliance on early warning, unattainable training standards, manpower waste, emphasis on an implausible threat, and other

failings. (15) This study led to a new mission for the Air Police, one of "reinforced security" and revoked the concept of a limited ground combat capability. In other words, they were to forego the concept of defense of overt threats and focus on expanded interior guard systems to counter a covert threat from within. The Air Police became experts at internal security of covert threats.

During the United States portion of the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong (VC) allies put to practice lessons learned from the Korean War and the French experience in Indo China. Between 0025 and 0035 local time on 1 November 1964, Viet Cong (VC) troops attacked Bien Hoa Air Base, 25 kilometers Northeast of Saigon. Positioning six 81mm mortars about 400 meters north of the base, the enemy gunners fired 60-80 rounds onto parked aircraft and troop billets. The VC then withdrew undetected and unmolested, leaving behind damage all out of proportion to the effort expended. The barrage killed four U.S. military personnel and wounded thirty. Of twenty aircraft hit, five were destroyed, and eight severely damaged. (16) Increasingly thereafter, US. Air Bases in Vietnam became routine targets for enemy ground attacks. The Air Force was ill-prepared to meet such an enemy threat. So started the need for adequate protection of air bases in the Republic of South Vietnam.

"I came to Vietnam as a security police officer with no idea of what a security police officer was supposed to do. I was taken from another career field, given no training and shipped to one of the most important bases in Southeast Asia where I was responsible for the protection of over

5,000 lives and millions of dollars in vital equipment. Even though the base and I have survived so far, I still believe the assignment was a mistake....I do not think Vietnam is the place for anyone in a position of authority to start from scratch in a new career field."

Letter to the Air Force Military Personnel
Center from an Air Police officer assigned
to Bien Hoa AB, Republic of Vietnam. (17)

This letter from a Security Police officer in the early days of the Vietnam War attested to the lack of preparedness by the Air Force to protect their air bases. It stands to reason that if the officers were untrained, then so were the rest of the SP forces. As history has shown, it usually takes the loss of life before the military moves to correct deficiencies. With the attacks on air bases starting to rise, the USAF Air Police Doctrine stressing a Cold War threat came under fire. Field commanders asserted that this concept "must be revised and more flexible rules and standards devised for the protection of USAF personnel and equipment in limited war areas."

(18) Complacency by the USAF toward air base defense continued, and the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was requested to provide security forces for base defense. Only as the buildup of U.S. forces progressed did the issue of major installation protection begin to be discussed seriously.

The ARVN's inability to provide adequate forces for base defense of sufficient quality, led the Air Force to request more forces from the U.S. Army as their presence became larger. At first the U. S. Army was willing to provide forces for base defense. But as the Army's mission changed, soldiers moved away from the air bases to better confront the

enemy which diminished their ability to provide forces for air base ground defense. This new posture by the Army was best described by Lt Gen Throckmorton, USA Deputy COMUSMAV, in 1964 when he stated:

"Major installations have priority for defense, but only against strong VC mass attacks. There are no plans to tie down U. S. troops to defend U.S. air bases against mortar and sneak attack, it costs too much in troops."

(19)

This position by the Army left the USAF in the familiar situation of trying to protect its own assets solely by internal means. The defense of air bases from the perimeter out was left to what the U. S. Army and ARVN could afford to provide after they had met their mission requirements. This posture was the accepted way of doing business in the first few years of the Vietnam War. It was given more credence when General William C. Westmoreland added in 1965:

"I expect that our battalions will be used to go after VC and that we will not be forced to expand our capabilities simply to protect ourselves.... Therefore, ... all forces of whatever service who find themselves operating without infantry protection... will be organized, trained and exercised to perform the defense and security functions." (20)

Yet implimentation of the theater commander's directive was not standard and far from effective. From 1965 through 1967 inspection teams from HQ/AF, PACAF and other agencies continued to tour air bases looking at the USAF and especially the Air Police's ability to provide adequate

airfield defense. One such project by the Department of Defense (DOD) Advanced Research Projects Agency reported in 1967:

"The USAF Air Police essentially have no training in the types of infantry tactics useful in base defense before they arrive in Southeast Asia, and their is no standard program set up to provide this type of combat training... when they arrive... programs vary in scope and quality from base to base; at some bases no training of this type exists." (21)

Regardless of findings, reports, and facts, the protection of air bases in Vietnam remained on the back-burner in priorities up until the 1968 Tet offensive. During Tet, the enemy unleashed over 84,000 troops to attack Saigon, thirty-six provincial capitals, sixty-four district capitals, fifty hamlets, ARVN and U.S. Army units, plus air bases throughout the country. (22) Direct action by local security policemen, individual ARVN and U. S. Army units positioned near air bases kept the possibility of total destruction of our air bases to a minimum. After Tet the USAF moved to enhance the ability of the Security Police to defend air bases. With the development of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Manual 207-25 in 1968, the Security Police were given guidance for guerrilla, insurgency and limited war environments. For the most part, PACAFM 207-25 reflected the insight learned from actual security operations in Vietnam. Gone was the rigid checklist approach of the USAF Cold War security program. PACAFM 207-25 defined a threefold security mission for the security police in Vietnam: 1) to prevent close-in enemy attacks, 2) to contain enemy forces penetrating the perimeter, and 3) to destroy enemy forces able to penetrate by counterattack. Three Combat Air Police "Safeside"

Squadrons were formed and rotated airfield defense duties in South Vietnam between April 1968 and March 1971. Safeside squadrons were different than regular air police units because of their ability to provide airfield protection by conducting combat patrols "external" to the air base. Forced withdrawals and related defense budget reductions caused the Safeside program to be scrapped. (23)

Although the Security Police have been called upon to perform their air base ground defense mission to some degree in Grenada, Panama, and during Desert Shield/Storm, they haven't been required to fully implement traditional airfield defense operations. The USAF Security Police still have divided mission priorities over whether to identify with their traditional law enforcement "police" mission which is the source of their manpower authorizations, or their war time airfield defense mission. Although equipment has vastly improved, training and structure require priority and revision to successfully meet the airfield defense mission today. Equipment must be reevaluated based on required mission capabilities and the Security Police should be configured during peace time to meet their war time support of the Air Force doctrine of Global Reach/Global Power.

CURRENT MISSION

The primary mission of the Air Force Security Police is to provide internal security for Air Force warfighting assets and police services for Air Force bases, people and property in the continental United States (CONUS) and at overseas locations. The security mission includes nuclear security, aircraft security and munitions security. It relies on early detection of threats to Air Force resources, physical security measures to delay the threat from reaching or damaging these resources, and a response capability to engage and neutralize the threat. The security force is composed of elements who provide close in security at the resource, patrol, and response forces. The patrols are composed of two security specialists normally on patrol in and around the area containing the resources and provide the initial response to engage and block the threat forces from reaching the resources. The response force is composed of one or more fire teams and patrols who provide additional blocking elements and/or a sweep element to defeat or repel the threat forces away from the resources. Security forces are armed with pistols, rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers. They may be augmented with military working dogs for patrol and explosive detection.

The police mission is divided between law enforcement operations and resource protection for bases in CONUS and overseas bases. Law enforcement operations include installation entry control, routine police patrol and response. It also entails crime prevention operations. Resource protection involves support to commanders on the installation for high value property and equipment and includes training, patrol, and planning. The security police law enforcement specialists are normally armed with

pistols and shotguns. They may be augmented with both narcotics detector and explosive detector military working dogs.

Currently the mission of the Air Force Security Police varies from one Major Command (MAJCOM) to another based on the mission of that MAJCOM. This is being further impacted today by the consolidation and elimination of several MAJCOMs. For example, prior to the consolidation of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) into Air Combat Command (ACC), the primary mission of the SAC Security Police was nuclear security. They had a secondary mission of base defense and in fact SAC had the largest number of security police tasked for this purpose. Air Training Command's (ATC) security police mission is primarily law enforcement. However, as a percentage, ATC has a large secondary mission of base defense. This variance in missions is consistent throughout the Air Force MAJCOMs. It becomes critical when planning for support of Theater CINC's war plans because all these MAJCOM security police manpower authorizations are based on their individual peacetime missions which vary from nuclear security on one end of the spectrum to law enforcement on the other.

Tasking for war plan support requires each CONUS MAJCOM to identify the number of security police available from their primary mission to support the war effort after calculating the number of security police required for support of their primary mission of CONUS base sustainment. This is calculated after implementing an expanded security posture and an expanded shift schedule augmented by non-security police wartime readiness personnel. This number, once approved by the MAJCOM, is

then organized into Unit Type Codes (UTCs) to be available to support theater taskings. Security police are generally organized into three types of UTCs. The first is the basic ground defense unit which may be a squad (13 people) or a flight (44 people), a command and control element (22 people) or a specialized element ranging from military working dog support to heavy weapons support. Once these are made available, they are then able to be tasked in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) against existing war plans. These elements available may not match the required numbers in the war plans because this is a secondary mission.

The secondary mission of the CONUS based security police is to provide mobility forces for the ground defense of overseas airfields projected for deployment or basing of US Air Forces. Forward deployed security police also have the secondary mission of air base ground defense. This mission requires defense across the spectrum of war. It calls for the capability to defend air bases from individual to small unit attacks, the capability to delay or defeat threats from small unit to special operations forces, and to delay conventional combined arms forces pending assistance from a tactical combat force or until critical resources can be removed or destroyed.

Before we go much further, it would be helpful to address the training received by security police base defense forces. All new security police attend air base ground defense training at Fort Dix, New Jersey upon completion of basic training and technical training at Lackland AFB. This initial air base ground defense training is provided by the U.S. Army in support of an agreement signed by the Chief of Staffs of the Army and Air Force in 1984 for the initial ground combat skills training of all Security

Police. At Fort Dix they are taught individual and small unit tactics, fieldcraft, tactical employment of weapons and communications systems, and concepts of base defense by Army personnel. Selected security police NCOs are sent to Fort Dix and trained to be squad or flight sergeants and members of the command and control elements. Selected company grade officers are trained at Fort Dix to be flight leaders and selected field grade officers are trained at Lackland AFB to be ground defense force commanders. All sustainment training must be conducted by the individual units at their home station based on the tasking that individual unit receives through the TPFDL or through participation in exercises with other units. Unfortunately, sustainment training often takes a back seat to training in their primary mission or to peacetime taskings which restrict available training time. Other specifically tasked elements receive initial and sustainment training based on their tasking and location, availability to facilities, and time available from their primary mission. Examples would be base defense military working dog teams, military working dog supervisory elements, mortar teams, heavy machine gun teams, and grenade machine gun teams. Thus, the only sustainment training is conducted if the individual is tasked with a base defense mission at their home station, and if time and space are available for this training. Therefore without sustainment training, perishable skills are lost due to lack of use, a great potential exists for the waste of training dollars with the obvious loss of effectiveness and readiness.

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The end of the Cold War did not make the world a safe place to live. Without the iron fist of the two superpowers suppressing traditional regional confrontations, the occurrence and probability of increased conflict between rival ethnic groups have exploded all over the globe. The emergence of nationalist movements striving to erase artificial borders created by previous superpowers and reestablish historical, traditional borders has split nations and created new ones in an amazingly short time. A major reshuffling of nations is occurring at a time when the availability of modern weaponry is at an all time high. The world in which we live is very dangerous. In many places the struggle for mere existence overshadows the desire for self-determination. Approximately one third of the earth's inhabitants still live in lands where the reins of power are in the hands of autocrats. The last great communist dictatorships of China and Cuba still exist, and about half the countries in Africa are ruled by tyrants. Saddam Hussein rules Iraq. Qaddafi's iron hand is the law in Libya, Assad dictates in Syria and dominates most of Lebanon, and Kim Il Sung rules North Korea. (24)

The end of the Cold War may have removed the United States' major known enemy, but it is incumbent upon us to keep in mind that there are still many struggles and many problems in our world. There will be ample opportunity for progress made in the name of peace to become undone in the future. For this reason alone it is vitally important that the United States, as the last remaining superpower, keep its guard up. (25)

For the first time in nearly a half a century, we are sculpting a defense strategy without the image of an implacable and monolithic Soviet Union. The Clinton administration has outlined a vision of national security which assumes non-confrontation among the super powers. The Cold War strategy of containment has given way to one of forward presence and regional defense. This policy demands we have forces for deployment to those key areas where the United States feels its strategic interests lie.

Clearly there is no need for forces to fight a global war on a moment's notice. But emergency security concerns are still global in scope and the need for American leadership is still critical. Even in a new era, we are the preeminent force for stability in the world. The responsibilities of leadership dictate we work to preserve collective security in a splintering world. (26)

In essence, the Air Force has two major challenges it must face to meet this changing world security environment. The first is to retain the ability to deal with the threats to U. S. interests around the world and the second is to prepare for the 21st century.

Unlike the past forty-five years, the location, dimension, timing, and technology level of future threats will be difficult to predict. We may need to fight with less preparation than we had in the Gulf War. One critical assumption from the Gulf War is that our future adversaries will not leave our airpower the freedom to operate in a totally secure rear area environment in the next conflict. The swift coalition victory in the Gulf leads our society to expect us to win just as quickly, just as decisively, and

with as little loss of life as during Desert Shield/Storm. To meet these expectations, the primary military threat to our national security is being unprepared for the crisis that is unexpected. The DOD feels the military must provide sufficient forces to deal with a major regional contingency, while keeping enough forces in reserve to deter others and meet our commitments for forward presence.

Our nation faces a difficult task of designing a military force of sufficient size and capability, while creating an affordable force into the next century. All services are facing an era of rapidly dwindling resources and competing national priorities. Former Secretary of Defense Cheney pointed out that the 1993 budget request is 7 percent below the 1992 level enacted by Congress and 29 percent below 1985. With the Clinton Administration's proposed \$14 billion cut in defense spending in FY 94, the overall DOD budget will be less than that of 1960-even though the costs of equipment and manpower are in no way comparable between then and now, and the quality of potential threats is much greater. (27)

For the Air Force, the 1993 budget will be 34 percent less than 1985's budget. The Air Force will have over 2200 fewer aircraft than it did in the mid-80's creating the imperative that we must protect what remains. In the last two years alone the Air Force has taken over 1000 airframes out of the active force. (28)

As we focus our defense efforts towards regional concerns, the crucial challenge facing the Air Force is to maintain the ability to project power into areas where we have little or no permanent presence. World

instability and the drawdown of our forces overseas translates into an even greater need for quick reaction, long reach and precisely applied firepower. (29)

The vision in which the USAF has placed its ability to meet its future missions is stated in the new Air Force Doctrine, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, March 1992. To accomplish a smaller force and preserve combat power the Air Force is adjusting its organizational structure, investing in prudent modernization and reshaping its active-reserve force mix. (30) Personnel reductions across the Air Force have resulted in a drawdown of security police from approximately 40,000 to a projected total of 28,000. *Forward deployed* is giving way to *forward presence* with the bulk of our military forces tasked for crisis response. The Air Force version of this is the concept of global reach, global power. With reduced numbers of security police overseas to guard air bases and overall reduced numbers in CONUS to draw from for mobility to respond to contingencies, changes must be made in the security police approach to its primary and secondary missions. The organization requires modification and the training must be revamped.

To meet the changing world and domestic environment the Air Force has already initiated revolutionary changes. SAC and TAC have consolidated into ACC, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) have consolidated into Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). Air Training Command has reorganized into Air Education and Training Command. Part of SAC and Military Airlift Command (MAC) have consolidated to become Air Mobility Command. Squadrons of

aircraft are being combined into Composite Wings which are capable of responding to a crisis anywhere in the world as a wing with the organic capability to ship its own cargo, refuel itself, and carry its own combat capability to enable it to support itself as it deploys to a contingency. These are only a few of the changes. The Air Force Security Police now must keep abreast of these changes to meet the needs of the modern Air Force. A smaller, no matter how capable, Air Force must protect its limited assets with renewed consequence. A more mobile Air Force, which relies on crisis response from the United States instead of a large forward deployed force, requires a force with the primary mission to provide capable, organic airfield defense. The primary USAF force tasked with this mission remains the Security Police. To effectively carry out this mission, the Security Police must also change its organization and training program to better provide the support the Air Force requires for "global reach/global power" now that we are in the post cold war period and as we prepare to enter the twenty-first century.

GLOBAL REACH/GLOBAL POWER

Mission

The mission of the security police in the post cold war period and as we implement the Air Force doctrine of the twenty-first century must be airfield defense. Airfield defense embodies all the functions the Security Police perform in support of the Air Force mission in peace and during contingencies, namely nuclear security, contingency security, and police operations. All Security Police must be capable to perform all the functions of Airfield Defense if they are to successfully provide for the safety and protection of the people, resources and facilities necessary to successfully accomplish the Air Force's wartime taskings. Each of these functions have both a peacetime and a wartime role. It incorporates the Security Police wartime mission as part of the primary mission. We will address each function in more detail, but we suggest that a detailed study be conducted to establish the best method of changing security police personnel authorizations from peacetime requirements to wartime requirements or a combination of both. Security police manpower authorizations should be based on the numbers required to defend airfields in projected deployment locations, forward deployed locations and Air Force Bases in CONUS. This manpower must be sufficient to meet the Air Force responsibility for defense of airfields consistent with Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Security. United States forces deploying in support of future contingencies will be characterized by joint operations.

Nuclear Security is the primary function of airfield defense. All Security Police must be proficient at securing our nation's nuclear weapons and

components. No greater calamity could face our nation than the loss or detonation of a nuclear weapon. Security procedures, physical security, and personnel security embodied in the Personnel Reliability Program must ensure the protection of nuclear weapons whether in storage or employment. Security Police must be trained and equipped to immediately detect threats to nuclear weapons, deny access to the weapons or components and respond quickly and effectively to remove the threat. They must be prepared to destroy the weapons/components if the risk of loss becomes apparent.

Before we move to contingency security, which will be addressed in detail in this paper, we will discuss police operations. This third function of airfield defense involves all the traditional police operations conducted by any civilian or military police department. The security police provide all the basic law enforcement, crime prevention and police investigation activities for the Air Force both in the continental United States and at all overseas locations regardless of the reason for deployment. This function also provides the police administrative functions and handles all vehicle registrations and preparation of identification credentials. This function of airfield defense involves primary support for all of the base other than the flightline and supports contingency security in all emergency situations. It also provides police service to the administrative portions of the base and the housing areas as well as base entry control.

The function of contingency security includes the internal security operations which provide "close-in" protection of aircraft and aircraft support resources, and both internal security operations and external

defensive operations in forward deployed or contingency locations. In the continental United States it principally means security of flightline operations and all the necessary support personnel and equipment to ensure sortie generation. It also involves security operations for training exercises which involve aircraft. In these modes, contingency security is performed by both point security on specific resources and patrol activity for the purpose of detection of threats to aircraft and to provide immediate response for detected threats. It is responsible for circulation control of personnel around the flightline.

The other half of the contingency security function involves security of aircraft and support personnel/equipment either deployed to forward operating bases or deployed in support of a contingency. Air Force personnel will normally be located in a rear area to perform their mission in support of the Theater CINC or Joint Task Force Commander. The rear area may include many types of personnel which must be integrated into one entity to be effective. This is critical for the function of contingency security. The doctrine for Rear Area Security describes the relationship between different entities, how they support each other, and lays out levels of threat which they could face. It also spells out the responsibility for each commander in the rear area for defense of their operation during each of these threat levels. During Threat Level One airfield defense forces must be prepared to detect and defeat criminal acts, sabotage, terrorist activity, demonstrations and riots and guerilla activity. Threat Level Two requires airfield defense forces to detect, delay or defeat special operations forces or regular guerilla forces with assistance when necessary from a response force. This response force could be dedicated US forces which

are responsible for the area of operations the airfield is located in. However, they could also come from Host Nation or allied forces in a coalition. These response forces will normally be responsible for a very large portion of the rear area. Therefore it is important to properly coordinate and exercise these response forces with an adequate degree of priority relevant to the importance of the airfield's mission in supporting the Theater CINC. During Threat Level Three the airfield defense forces must be able to delay a large conventional or combined arms attack until the Rear Area Commander can direct a tactical combat force to defeat or drive away the threat. Airfield defense forces must be capable of delaying this force until help arrives or until the airfield is successfully evacuated and appropriate demolition is completed. There are several fundamental changes which can be made to significantly improve the ability of the Air Force to successfully conduct airfield defense consistent with joint doctrine. We will spell these out under the aspects of organize/equip, and train.

Organization and Equipment

Every security police unit must be organized in peacetime the way it would fight in war. No security police personnel should be left out of being organized for war, including those without a specific tasking in the war plans. In a smaller Air Force, dependent upon a capability for rapid crisis response, everyone on active duty or in the reserve components must be organized into the basic structure on a day-to-day basis. There may not be time in the next contingency to get organized. Each security police unit should be organized and packaged for deployment into flights and squads for airfield defense. The day-to-day operations flight must be organized into a command and control element with which the ground defense force

commander can deploy in twenty-four hours. The immediate result of this organizational plan provides a mobile combat force of security police available to deploy with its parent wing anywhere in the world within a minimum time. Most important, the wing commander has an organic capability to deploy without having to worry about a defense element from another unit marrying up with his combat aviation units for the first time at the deployed location.

Specialized teams should be organized and packaged for deployment as necessary to support the theater contingency plans with a factor built in for reinforcement or replacement. These should be carefully planned by the theater air component personnel and established at those locations most suitable for sustainment training. These units would marry up with those core units which deploy as a package in support of the combat aviation squadron and other units deploying into their destination as part of the time phased force deployment listing (TPFDL). These airfield defense requirements would be dependent on the mission tasking in support of the Theater CINC, Threat Level in the deployment location and capabilities of adversary forces, as well as the quality and capabilities of other US forces, allied forces and host nation forces.

The key to making this structure work is the organization of support personnel at their home station to provide peacetime mission support at home while the security police deploy as airfield defense forces in crisis response. Those personnel with no wartime tasking must be organized into Ready forces available to replace deployed personnel at home station.

They must be tasked to assume the necessary security and law enforcement functions vacated by the security police.

Equipment for this base defense force should be of four types. We will address generally each type of equipment, individual, weaponry, communications, and transportation, and describe the basic requirements within each specific organizational element. Every security police person must have the basic individual equipment for deployment to any contingency within five days notification. Whether they have a specific theater tasking or not does not negate the need for all security police personnel to have the capability to go to the field and perform each of the functions in support of airfield defense.

Support personnel in the core package to support combat aviation squadrons at deployment locations or those with a mobility tasking for follow-on support must be organized, trained and equipped to support airfield defense. These personnel must be capable of defending themselves, providing the minimum protection for their equipment and augmenting the Security Police against higher level threats until assistance arrives. All deployable support personnel must be capable of basic combat skills.

The weapons requirements must be based on the capability desired at each level of organization for integrated organic firepower to defeat or delay the appropriate threat level forces. The communications requirement must provide the capability for the element to operate tactically, sound the alarm and provide essential information to the command and control element, and be interoperable with other United States, coalition or host nation forces

with which they may be operating. The transportation requirement is based on the required capability to move troops and supplies, to patrol, and to respond to threats in a safe environment.

The airfield defense squad is the smallest packaged general security police tactical element. It must be capable of operating in a peacetime environment and by itself in a Threat Level One environment. The squad may be employed for contingency security in airfield defense in Threat Level One, Two or Three when deployed with other squads or flights to create an Airfield Defense Squadron. It normally provides airfield defense for limited operations, such as Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) security, or deployment of any type aircraft less than a squadron. It must be supported by other US forces, Host Nation forces or allied forces. The squad must have some kind of a command and control structure to which it reports. An example is the TALCE Commander. Comprised of thirteen security police personnel the squad must be capable of fighting by itself or be integrated with other squads, flights or special teams. Firepower for the squad should be provided by a leader with a rifle, six riflemen, three grenadiers, and three machine gunners. It must have the capability to operate in fire teams to place fire on point targets, and to provide suppression fire and indirect fire at short ranges for maneuver or defeat of small elements. Communications for the squad should consist of handheld tactical radios for the squad leader and the three fire team leaders to direct forces for patrol, detection and response to emergencies. Transportation for the squad should consist of a vehicle that can provide patrol and response capability for a fire team and double as a small supply vehicle. Each squad should have a small all terrain vehicle with trailer to run

errands and resupply. The squad must be capable of operating in twelve hour shifts for minimum periods of time. Depending on the known threat and availability of other forces, several squads may be required to be deployed. When the need for more than one squad arises, consideration should be made to sending a Security Police officer to provide command and control or to command a full airfield defense flight if additional squads are required.

The airfield defense flight is the primary deployable security police tactical element. It will generally provide the minimum airfield defense capability for a combat aviation squadron. It is the core airfield defense package for the deployment of a combat aviation squadron (this includes any aircraft squadron deploying in support of the contingency). Comprised of forty-four security personnel it must be capable of fighting by itself or be integrated with other squads and flights or special elements in all threat levels. A flight consists of three squads. Weaponry for the flight are provided by twenty-six riflemen (including the leaders), nine grenadiers, eight machinegunners and one grenade machine gunner. Its firepower must be capable of direct fire against point targets, direct and indirect suppression fire for short range maneuver of fire teams and squads and long range suppression fire to fix, channel or defeat adversaries in small units or vehicles. Communications requirements should be a base station, a tactical repeater and fourteen handheld tactical radios. It must be capable of communicating with its internal squads, other flights and squads, and other US forces, Host Nation, or allied forces. Transportation for the flight should consist of four vehicles that can provide a patrol and response

capability for a fire team. Each flight should have four small all terrain vehicles with two trailers to run errands and resupply.

When additional command and control personnel are required to transform multiple squads and flights into an airfield defense squadron, the airfield defense headquarters element can be deployed. This organization consists of twenty-two personnel and is the deployable element that ties all the flights, squads, and special teams together to form an airfield defense squadron. The element provides an airfield defense force commander, operations officer, first sergeant, operations staff, intelligence liaison, communications repair specialists, small arms repair specialists, a security element, and administration and personnel specialists. It will normally only operate with combinations of squads, flights or special teams and when one or more combat aviation squadrons are deployed. Weaponry for this element consists of ten shotguns for use by flights and squads when appropriate and twenty-two rifles for self defense and reinforcement purposes only. Its communications equipment will consist of a base station, two tactical repeaters, and five handheld tactical radios. It must be able to direct flight, squad or special team operations as well as to communicate with supporting US forces, Host Nation or allied forces. It must be integrated into the rear area security communications network to provide information, coordinate security actions within the common areas of operation and coordinate assistance from the response force during hostilities involving Threat Level Two forces and tactical combat forces in hostilities involving Threat Level Three forces. The transportation requirements include a two and a half ton truck for moving equipment, supplies, and personnel; one all terrain vehicle with trailer; and five

vehicles capable of running administrative errands, supply, and supporting special teams. This element must be the focal point for supporting flight, squad and special team operations. It will provide the heavy transportation, communications repair, weapons repair, logistics support, administrative and personnel support as well as staff and liaison personnel to coordinate operations on the airfield and in the rear area. This element also provides the necessary link to the intelligence network both on the base and within the rear area. They are the essential element for molding several elements of troops into a deployed squadron. They can support one flight or many flights. They are critical for deployment to locations where there is no in place Security Police Squadron or where a Threat Level Two or Three exists.

The airfield defense military working dog support element is comprised of four personnel (kennelmaster, trainer, and two kennel support personnel) who deploy to support eight to sixteen military working dog teams. The element deploys to support a command and control element to provide kennel support for deployed military working dogs. It is capable of operating in any threat level environment. The element's weaponry consists of four rifles for personal defense. Its communications equipment consists of two handheld tactical radios for administrative purposes and dispatch for emergency assistance in military working dog support. This element's transportation support comes from the command and control element.

The airfield defense military working dog team element should consist of two personnel and two military working dogs. This element deploys in

support of a command and control element, squad or flight. It is capable of deploying into any threat level environment. Its weaponry consists of a two submachine guns for personal protection. The element's communications equipment consists of two handheld tactical radios for administrative purposes, detection and dispatch; transportation is provided by the supported element. It provides the capability to patrol individually or in concert with other teams. It augments perimeter detection and specialized detection. Each team will consist of one patrol dog and one patrol/explosive detector dog.

The airfield defense heavy weapons team consists of four personnel who deploy in support of a command and control element, squad or flight. It is capable of operating in any threat level environment. It will normally augment a squad or flight to provide long range, heavy suppression fire against avenues of approach or to channel adversaries into areas where other organic weaponry will be effective. It provides effective final protective fire. Its weaponry consists of four rifles for personal defense and three 40mm grenade machine guns. The team requires two handheld tactical radio for communications and receives transportation support from the element its supporting. For example, when supporting a headquarters element, vehicles may be provided for mounting to provide heavy firepower to augment the mobile reserve.

The airfield defense mortar battery is comprised of twenty personnel who deploy in support of an airfield defense squadron to provide high explosive indirect fire and illumination in support of operations during Threat Level Three. It is comprised of a fire direction center element of four personnel

and four mortar teams of four personnel each. The fire direction element provides fire direction for the four mortar teams. Its weaponry consists of four rifles for personal protection and it requires two handheld tactical radios for communications. The element will normally be colocated with the airfield defense operations center and depends on the headquarters element for transportation. Each mortar team is comprised of four personnel. Weapon requirements consist of four rifles for each team for personal protection and an 81mm mortar. It is capable of firing in battery for suppression fire or individually against specific targets. It must provide infrared illumination to support the airfield defense squadron's night fighting equipment. For communications it requires a handheld tactical radio and receives transportation support from the headquarters element.

The air defense squad is comprised of thirteen personnel who deploy in support of an airfield defense heavy flight or an airfield defense squadron to provide daytime short range air defense coverage in support of operations during threat level two. It is comprised of one leader and three stinger fire teams of four personnel each. Its weaponry consists of thirteen rifles and fifteen stingers. The squad requires four hand-held tactical radios for communications and deploys with four CLAWs with trailers.

The air defense element is comprised of twenty personnel who deploy in support of airfield defense heavy flights and reinforced squadrons to provide day/night adverse weather short range air defense coverage in support of operations during threat level three. It is comprised of a two person leader section and nine avenger crews of two personnel each. Its

weaponry consists of twenty rifles and nine avenger systems (nine M2 machine guns and seventy-two stinger missiles). The element is equipped with organic tactical radios for each avenger system and ten tactical handheld radios for communications.

Training

All security police should be trained in the basic discipline of airfield defense and should maintain it with a combination of local unit sustainment training and participation in exercises at regional evaluation centers, theater mobility exercises, or the Joint Readiness Training Center. Instead of only a select number of NCOs being trained as squad and flight sergeants consistent with war plan taskings, all NCOs should receive initial and sustainment training as part of their professional development. This material should become part of their testing for promotion and the initial training a requirement for their career upgrade training. All security police company grade officers would be required to receive initial and sustainment airfield defense training as a flight leader with emphasis on being a sector leader or augmentation for a command and control element. Upgrade and promotion would be contingent on receiving and maintaining this training. All security police field grade officers would be required to receive initial and sustainment airfield defense training as a ground defense force commander or member of the command and control element. Their promotion and upgrade would be contingent on receiving this training. All security police would be required to be certified and evaluated annually on the appropriate level of airfield defense training for their grade.

All Air Force members would be required to receive initial weapons training and those with a wartime tasking would receive annual sustainment training on weapons and small unit tactics. The security police would conduct this sustainment training at their local unit. Those personnel would augment this local training with mobility exercises in CONUS or as deployed to their tasked theater. Those personnel without a wartime tasking, but responsible for CONUS base sustainment, would receive training to prepare them for augmentation duty at home station to replace security police deployed in support of the contingency. They would be initially trained to the minimum level in law enforcement and security, and receive annual sustainment training. Ideally, this sustainment training would be on-the-job while the security police accomplished their mobility training for airfield defense in exercises either in CONUS or overseas theaters.

"People are the decisive factor in war." (31) We in the Air Force tend to emphasize the importance of our high-tech equipment, but it is the people behind the equipment, the human factor, that is far more important. Training must be the key element in which the United States Air Force will build its foundation for mission accomplishments into the next century.

The training we provide our forces must be realistic, and must be focused on preparing our forces for combat. As our Air Force gets smaller, each flying resource we retain becomes that much more important to our combat effectiveness. Each function within the USAF must get the most out of each training dollar. All units tasked with a wartime mission needs to ensure their training time is spent towards meeting actual wartime

requirements and is not wasted. Training has little value unless it is focused on the ultimate purpose of air power - to fight and win. (32) The USAF must train as it plans to fight. Exercises must replicate to the extent possible the chaos, stress, intensity, tempo, unpredictability, and violence of war. (33) Training must be innovative using problem solving, jointness, and degraded capabilities.

The USAF has developed outstanding technical training abilities required to keep its high-tech aircraft flying. The area in which it has failed to meet a basic need of those who must deploy with these high-tech weapons systems, is in the individual combat skills area. Every member of the "armed forces" must be trained in the basic skill of personal protection. The drawdown to a smaller Air Force also means there will be less Security Police available to provide airfield defense. This fact will require all Air Force personnel to be able to protect themselves and if needed to augment the available airfield defense forces.

As each service struggles with downsizing, the availability of realistic training exercises, scenarios, and training areas become more critical to combat effectiveness. Special attention should be given to training for joint and combined operations. The draft Army Field Manual 525-13 and Air Force Manual 3-3 outline the joint operational concept for air base ground defense (ABGD), and should be used for guidance when USAF forces join with US Army forces for training evaluations.

Jointness in regards to training is the only sensible way that the Air Force can expect to meet its defensive mission into the next century. Airfields

are for the most part located in rear areas and are seldom located based on ground tactical considerations. This lack of ground tactical consideration coupled with the ever-expanding shortage of security police highlights the criticality of close and careful Air Force coordination and integration with whatever combat forces are co-located in the immediate area of an airfield.

Although the supported airfield may be in the area of responsibility (AOR) of US Marines or host nation forces (HN), the majority of the time, the supported airfield will be within the AOR of the US Army.

When deployed within an AOR controlled by the US Army, the Army echelon commander will allocate to the Air Force security police their own AOR. This AOR is the Air Force tactical boundary and may extend past the fixed airfield perimeter. It is an area identified and mutually agreed upon by the Army echelon commander and the senior Air Force tactical commander based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time (METT-T). Only through developing jointness focused training can such a defensive posture be coordinated and integrated to best maximize each force's combat power.

The US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to provide an intense training environment for its light forces. The JRTC is focused at the battalion level with support augmentation and is ideal for joint and combined operations. Presently located at Fort Chaffee, AR, and soon to move to Fort Polk, LA, the JRTC is the premier joint training area now available for USAF Security Police evaluations. The training at JRTC is focuses on key

training objectives which are not available at home station. The training is designed to begin many months before a unit's departure from its home station and provides the unit with the most stressful, realistic environment possible---short of actual combat. The training objectives of each unit tasked for a JRTC rotation require them to coordinate with other joint elements prior to the exercise. This requirement forces both US Army and USAF units to work together on joint issues before deploying.

The key element to a successful JRTC rotation is the observer/controller (O/C) team. Its charter is to serve as primary trainers and coaches during each training cycle. Their work actually begins several months before a unit arrives. The O/C team must coordinate with the unit to ensure that the operations order is written specifically for that unit's mission and to meet that unit's training objectives. The O/C team deploys to the unit's home station just prior to the start of each exercise, explains the rules of engagement, discusses how MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) will be incorporated into these rules and provides the initial operations order. Once the unit is on the ground, the O/C's go everywhere the unit goes and provides comprehensive after-action reviews to the deployed unit's chain of command. At the conclusion of the training, a report is provided to assist the unit in its future home station training.

CONCLUSIONS

This project recommends a detailed study to be conducted to determine the feasibility of changing Security Police personnel authorizations from peacetime authorizations to wartime authorizations; implimentation of Airfield Defense as the new Security Police mission which includes nuclear security, contingency security and police operations; increased weapons and tactics training for Security Police, Air Force mobility tasked personnel, and CONUS base sustainment personnel; regular rotation of Airfield Defense Squadrons to JRTC for joint training; creation of an Airfield Defense heavy weapons element, mortar battery, heavy flight, squadrons, and reinforced squadrons; modifications in personnel and equipment for the current Air Base Ground Defense flight, headquarters element, kennel support element, and military working dog element; implimentation of Airfield Defense training as part of the upgrade training program for all Security Police personnel; and specifically tying Airfield Defense deployment packages to specific aircraft deployment packages in specific threat scenarios. In summary, implementing these changes will provide the Air Force security police with one overriding mission of base defense which incorporates all the MAJCOM missions. It takes a smaller CONUS oriented security police force and organizes, trains and equips the entire force to be capable of deployment to support combat aviation units in the crisis response role. It ensures all security police personnel have the same basic base defense skills and requires annual sustainment training. This training and organization ensures each wing has an organic basic tactical ground defense organization and command and control element. It prevents major ground defense elements from being thrown together for

the first time when they deploy and creates a process for smooth transition from peacetime employment to crisis response. It provides specialized teams available to be tasked through the TPFD to beef up basic ground defense tactical units with heavy weapons teams and specialized dog teams as the situation dictates. It provides a force which can operate in the joint rear area with other US Armed Forces, Host Nation Forces, and Coalition Forces. It provides a capable force which can respond quickly to establish a bastion from which air power can be projected safely in support of the theater mission and bring enough firepower that it can sustain itself in the rear area without becoming a burden on other friendly forces. Finally it ensures a force in the rear area which can team up with other forces and provide effective security for the rear area.

GLOSSARY

ABGD: Air Base Ground Defense.

AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System.

Airfield: A location capable of supporting flying operations.

Base: A locality from which operations are projected or supported with logistics or operations support.

Boundary: (airfield, base, installation) Normally the dividing line between internal and external defense.

CLAWS. Carrier Light Auxiliary Weapon System.

HMMWV. Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle.

TALCE: Tanker Airlift Control Element.

Threat Level One: Hostile activity characterized by enemy-controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and terrorism.

Threat Level Two: Hostile activity characterized by combat operations conducted by unconventional forces, raids, ambushes, or reconnaissance.

Threat Level Three: Hostile activity characterized by battalion size or larger heliborne operations, airborne operations, amphibious operations, ground force deliberate operations, and infiltration operations.

ACC: Air Combat Command.

AMC: Air Mobility Command.

AFMC: Air Force Materiel Command.

AETC: Air Education Training Command.

ADS: Airfield Defense Squadron.

UN: United Nations.

FT: Fire Team

APPENDIX 1

THREAT LEVEL I AIRFIELD DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Fire Team. Four defenders with four rifles or one machine gun and three rifles.

Type Deployment:

- TALCE Security
- Single aircraft deployments
- AWACs deployments
- Airlift forward deployments for security at austere locations

Package Capabilities:

Smallest deployable element, day/night capable, provides aircraft "close-in" security for USAF resources. (Usually of short duration and in locations with friendly control) Capable of self defense and protection of organic aircraft.

Equipment Requirements:

Individual equipment with ruck-sack.

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Squad. Thirteen defenders with three machine guns, three grenade launchers, and seven rifles.

Type Deployment:

- Expanded "close-in" airfield security
- Taxiway/parking ramp security
- Combat Control Team (CCT) "close-in" security

Package Capabilities:

Smallest tactical deployable element, day/night capable of providing expanded protection for several "close-in" aircraft resources within a small area. (Must be supported by other U.S. or Host Nation forces.) Capable of self defense and protection of organic aircraft against hostile elements up to small unit guerilla forces.

Equipment Requirements:

- Four tactical radios.
- One HMMWV
- One CLAW

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Flight. Forty-four defenders with one 40mm grenade machine gun, nine machine guns, nine grenade launchers, and twenty-six rifles.

Type Deployment:

- Deployed with a squadron of aircraft

Package Capabilities:

Basic tactical deployable element, both day and night capable. Minimum core package capable of providing twenty-four hour "close-in" airfield security for several aircraft resources within an aircraft parking area or a single aircraft squadron. Capable of self defense and protection of organic aircraft against hostile activities up to small unit guerilla activity.

Equipment Requirements:

- One radio base station.
- One radio tactical repeater.
- Fourteen tactical radios.
- Four HMMWVs.
- Four CLAWs.

APPENDIX 2

THREAT LEVEL 2

AIRFIELD DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Heavy Flight.* Up to ninety-nine defenders with three 40mm grenade machine guns, fifteen machine guns, fifteen grenade launchers, eight submachine guns, and sixty-one rifles. Comprised of one Airfield Defense Flight, two Airfield Defense Squads, one Airfield Defense Military Working Dog Support Element, four Airfield Defense Squadron Military Working Dog Teams, one Airfield Defense Heavy Weapon Team, and one Air Defense Squad.

Type Deployment:

- Deployed with a squadron of aircraft
- Deployed with up to a squadron of United Nations aircraft involved in peace keeping, peace making, or peace enforcement missions.

Package Capabilities:

Reinforced airfield defense flight capable of day/night operations in support of "close-in" aircraft security, limited combined/joint external operations for tactical defense of the airfield, and daytime short range air defense. Relies on other U.S or Host Nation forces for reinforcement. Capable of defeating or delaying special forces units until reinforcement by area response forces.

Equipment Requirements:

- One radio base station.
- One radio tactical repeater.
- Up to thirty-four tactical radios.
- Up to six HMMWVs.
- Up to ten CLAWs.
- Four patrol dogs
- Four explosive detector dogs.
- Fifteen stingers.

* Note: The Airfield Defense Heavy Flight described above is the maximum size for this element. It can be any combination of an Airfield Defense Flight with additions of up to two Airfield Defense Squads, Military Working Dog elements, and a Heavy Weapon Team.

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Squadron. A minimum of two hundred and eleven defenders with four 40mm grenade machine guns, thirty-six machine guns, thirty-six grenade launchers, and one hundred thirty-nine rifles. It is comprised of four Airfield Defense Flights, one Airfield Defense Headquarters Element, and one Air Defense Squad.

Type Deployment:

- Deployed with one or more squadrons of aircraft.
- Deployed with one or more squadrons of United Nations aircraft in support of peace keeping, peace making, and peace enforcement for extended periods.

Package Capabilities:

Capable of providing day/night capable forces for "close-in" aircraft security, participating externally in combined/joint operations for the tactical defense of the airfield, and daytime short range air defense. Relies on other U.S. or Host Nation forces for reinforcement. Capable of defeating or delaying special forces teams until reinforcement by the area response force.

Equipment Requirements:

- Five radio base stations.
- Six radio tactical repeaters.
- Sixty-five tactical radios.
- Twenty-one HMMWVs.
- Twenty CLAWs.
- Ground Surveillance Radar.
- Fifteen Stingers.

APPENDIX 3

THREAT LEVEL 3

AIRFIELD DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE

Force Size:

Airfield Defense Reinforced Squadron.* Minimum of five hundred twenty-six defenders with four 81mm mortars, twenty-one 40mm grenade machine guns, seventy-five machine guns, seventy-five grenade launchers, sixteen submachine guns, and three hundred twenty rifles. It is comprised of one Airfield Defense Headquarters Element, five Airfield Defense Heavy Flights, three Airfield Defense Heavy Weapons Teams, two Airfield Defense Military Working Dog Support Elements, eight Military Working Dog Teams, one Airfield Defense Mortar Battery, and an Air Defense Element.

Type Deployment:

- Deployed with multiple squadrons of aircraft
- Deployed with multiple squadrons of United Nations aircraft involved in peace keeping, peace making, and peace enforcement missions.

Package Capabilities:

Reinforced Airfield Defense Squadron capable of sustained day/night operations for "close-in" aircraft security, joint/combined external operations for tactical defense of the airfield, and air defense. Relies on U.S. or Host Nation forces for reinforcement. Capable of delaying a

combined arms, conventional attack until reinforcement by a Tactical Combat Force or successful evacuation/detonation of critical resources.

Equipment Requirements:

- Six radio base stations.
- Seven radio tactical repeaters.
- One hundred ninety-six tactical radios.
- Thirty-five HMMWVs.
- Thirty-one CLAWs
- Twelve patrol dogs.
- Twelve explosive detector dogs.
- Ground surveillance radar.
- Eight avenger systems.

***Note:** This Airfield Defense Reinforced Squadron is the minimum sized unit to deploy into an area with a Threat Level 3 and operate successfully if attacked. This structure is designed so that depending on the terrain, support, and other factors of METT-T, any variety of Airfield Defense elements may be added to improve specific capabilities. Due to airlift constraints for vehicle deployment, vehicle prepositioning must be used to the maximum extent possible.

ENDNOTES

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4. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Washington D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979), 4.

5. Ibid., 5.

6. The Air Police Provost Marshal, Local Ground Defense of Air Bases (Washington: U.S. Department of The Air Force, 25 June 1953), 1.

7. Department of the Air Force, Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations, Air Force Regulation 355-4 (Washington: U. S. Department of the Air Force, 3 Mar 1953), 2.

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10. Department of the Air Force, Far Eastern Air Forces Report on the Korean War, Volume II (Washington: U.S. Department of the Air Force, 26 March 1954), 132-133.

11. Fox, 6.

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14. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1954, Part 2. 1385-1396.

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16. Kenneth D. Sams, Historical Background to the Viet Cong Mortar Attack on Bien Hoa, 1 November 1964 (Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Project CHECO, 9 November 1964); Letter from 13th Air Force to Pacific Air Forces, Subject: Bien Hoa Incident, 3 December 1964, .

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18. Ibid., 14.

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22. Ibid., 54.

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25. Ibid., 8.

26. Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force Prepared Statement to House Armed Services Committee on Current Posture and Future Outlook of the Air Force 20 February 1992, 2.

27. Ibid., 5.

28. Ibid., 3.

29. Ibid., 10.

30. Ibid., 17.

31. Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, Vol I, (Washington, US Department of the Air Force, March 1992), 18.

32. Ibid., 18.

33. Ibid., 18.

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